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The German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations (1940-1942) (Historical Study Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-261a)

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The German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations (1940-1942)

(Historical Study Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-261a)

Clausewitz observed of Russia that "it was a country which could be subdued only by its own weakness and by the effects of internal dissension. In order to strike these vulnerable spots of its body politic, Russia would have to be agitated at the very center." In reading this study, the military student will realize how dearly the Germans had to pay for ignoring Clausewitz's advice.
     The purpose of this study is to describe German planning and operations in the first part of the campaign against Russia. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad. A subsequent volume will depict the course of events from the Russian counteroffensive in November 1942 to the capture of Berlin in April 1945.
     The material for this study was obtained from German military records now in the custody of The Adjutant General, Department of the Army. Monographs by former German general officers who had an active part in the planning and operations provided additional information. The authors of these monographs, prepared for the Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, include General-oberst (Gen.) Franz Haider, Chief of Staff of the German Army from 1938-42; Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, a former corps, army, and army group commander on the Russian front: and several others.
     The study was written by Mr. George E. Blau of the Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History. In his presentation, the author made every effort to give an objective account of Germany's initial efforts to conquer Soviet Russia in World War II.
 
Contents
  • PART ONE. PLANNING
    • Chapter 1. Strategic Planning
      • Initial Discussions (July 1940)
      • The Marcks Plan (5 August 1940)
      • Staff Work (August-September 1940)
      • Admiral Raeder's Suggestions (26 September 1940)
      • Strategic Survey (October 1940)
      • The Preliminary Plan (November-5 December 1940)
      • General Staff and Command Post Exercises (November-December 1940)
      • Economic Survey
      • Directive BARBAROSSA (18 December 1940)
    • Chapter 2. Operational Planning
      • The Army's Operation Order (3 February 1941)
      • Initiation of Subordinate Staffs (February-March 1941)
      • Changes in Plans (March-April 1941)
      • Army Group South
      • Far North
      • Delay in the Start
      • The Draft of Directive No. 32 (11 June 1941)
      • Strategic Concentration (21 June 1941)
      • Air Support
      • Other Factors
      • Estimate of Soviet Strength (June 1941)
      • Sources of Information
      • Estimate of Red Army Dispositions
      • Estimate of Soviet Air Force Strength
  • PART TWO. OPERATIONS IN 1941
    • Chapter 3. The Initial Operations (22 June-31 July 1941)
      • D Day
      • The Situation on 30 June 1941
      • Developments in Early July 1941
      • The Mid-July Estimate
      • Directive No. 33 (19 July 1941)
      • The Army's Letter to the Armed Forces High Command
      • The Situation toward the End of July 1941
    • Chapter 4. Planning for Future Operations
      • The Army's Order of 28 July 1941
      • Directive No. 34 (30 July 1941)
      • Hitler's Vacillation over Strategy
      • The Supplement to Directive No. 34 (12 August 1941)
      • Developments to Mid-August 1941
      • The Army Memorandum of 18 August 1941
      • Hitler's Decision (20 August 1941)
    • Chapter 5. The Diversion and Reassembly
      • The Personnel Situation (End of August 1941)
      • Increasing Logistical Difficulties (Early September 1941)
      • POL
      • Track-Laying and Wheeled Vehicles
      • Developments in Mid-September 1941
      • Directive No. 35 (6 September 1941)
      • The Situation at the End of September 1941
      • Military-Economic Survey (2 October 1941)
      • The Muddy Period and Its Effect on Operations (October 1941)
      • Hitler's Plan for the Seizure of Moscow (12 October 1941)
    • Chapter 6. The German Attack on Moscow
      • Strategic Factors
      • Last-Minute Planning and Operations to 13 November 1941
      • The Course of the Offensive (14 November-5 December 1941)
      • The Personnel Situation (End of November 1941)
      • Critique
  • PART THREE. 1942—THE YEAR OF INDECISION
    • Chapter 7. The Russian Counteroffensive (December 1941-February 1942)
      • The First German Reverses
      • Hitler's Directive No. 39 (3 December 1941)
      • The Army High Command Order of 8 December 1941
      • Intelligence Estimate
      • Plans
      • The Mission of the Army Groups
      • Conduct of Operations
      • Organization
      • The Red Army Seizes the Initiative
      • Developments to 25 December 1941
      • The German Crisis in Mid-January 1942
      • The Crisis Reaches Its Climax (Beginning of February 1942)
      • The Russian Offensive Is Halted (20 February 1942)
      • Critique
    • Chapter 8. Preliminary Planning for a German Offensive in the Caucasus, 1942
      • Exploratory Steps (July 1940-September 1941)
      • The First Plan for a Caucasus Operation (October 1941)
      • Caucasus Planning in November 1941
      • Effects of the Moscow Setback (January 1942)
      • The First Preparatory Orders (February 1942)
      • The Navy's Role (February 1942)
      • Intelligence Estimate (20 February 1942)
      • Hitler's Preoccupations in Early March 1942
      • The Situation at the End of March 1942
    • Chapter 9. Preparations for the German Summer Offensive
      • Directive No. 41 (5 April 1942)
      • Estimates, Delays, and Disappointments in April 1942
      • Intelligence Estimate
      • Delay in the Preliminary Operations
      • The Situation at Army Group Center
      • Chain of Command
      • Transportation
      • Turkey Remains Neutral
      • Logistical Preparations
      • Timing
      • Chain of Command
      • Supplies
      • Motor Vehicles
      • Rail Transportation
      • Summary
      • Organizational Problems
      • Rehabilitation of Units
      • Shortage of Technicians
      • Construction of Fortifications
      • Oil Brigade Caucasus
      • Casualties and Replacements
      • The Participation of Germany's Allies
      • Rear Area Security
      • Army Group South's Defense Line
      • The Role of Army Group A
      • Feint and Counterfeit
      • Warning Notes (May 1942)
      • The Armed Forces Potential in the Spring of 1942
      • The Preliminary Operations (May-June 1942)
      • Last-Minute Incidents and Impressions (June 1942)
    • Chapter 10. Initial Operations and New Plans (July 1942)
      • The First Phase (28 June-6 July 1942)
      • The Second Phase (30 June-7 July 1942)
      • Changes in German Order of Battle (July 1942)
      • The Army Group A Offensive
      • The Operation Plan
      • The Army Group A Attack
      • German and Russian Weaknesses
      • Directive No. 43
      • The Continuation of Operations
      • The Situation of the Other Army Groups by 20 July 1942
      • Directive No. 44 (21 July 1942)
      • Directive No. 45 (23 July 1942)
      • German Shortages
      • Tanks
      • Gasoline
      • Stalingrad Takes Priority Over the Caucasus (End of July 1942)
    • Chapter 11. The Period of Stagnation (August-October 1942)
      • Developments to Mid-August 1942
      • Personnel and Other Problems (16-18 August 1942)
      • The Situation in the Caucasus (Second Half of August 1942)
      • The Opening of the Battle for Stalingrad (End of August 1942)
      • The German Leadership Crisis (September 1942)
      • Faulty Intelligence and Its Interpretation
      • The German Offensive Grinds to a Halt (26 September 1942)
      • German Estimates in October and Early November 1942
      • Army Group A
      • Army Group B
      • The Estimate of 6 November
      • The Oil of the Caucasus
      • German Efforts at Production
      • Russian Supplies
      • Local Engagements (October-Mid-November 1942)
    • Chapter 12. Critical Analysis of the German Summer Offensive in 1942
      • Different Concepts of Strategy
      • Differences over the Choice of Objective
      • Mistakes in the Execution of the German Offensive
  • APPENDICES
    • A. List of German Military Leaders (July 1940-November 1942)
    • B. Chronology of Events
    • C. Bibliographical Note
  • MAPS
    • 1. General Reference Map of Eastern Europe
    • 2. The Marcks Plan
    • 3. The Army Plan
    • 4. General Reference Map of the Far North
    • 5. The Final Plan for Operation BARBAROSSA
    • 6. German and Russian Dispositions (June 1941)
    • 7. Situation on 19 July 1941
    • 8. Situation on 30 July 1941
    • 9. The Army Plan of 18 August 1941
    • 10. Situation in Mid-September 1941
    • 11. Situation on 6 October 1941
    • 12. Situation on 5 December 1941
    • 13. Situation in Mid-January 1942
    • 14. General Reference Map of the Caucasus Area
    • 15. Situation at the End of June 1942
    • 16. Situation on 20 July 1942
    • 17. Situation on 18 November 1942
  • CHARTS
    • 1. German Chain of Command (1 July 1940)
    • 2. Order of Battle on 21 June 1941
    • 3. German Order of Battle—Russian Theater of War (January 1942)
    • 4. German Order of Battle—Russian Theater of War (Beginning of July 1942)
    • 5. German Order of Battle—Russian Theater of War (12 August 1942)

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