World War II News Blog
News about World War II, including links to articles and web sites, brief
articles on different aspects of World War II history, plus notices of
new releases of books and other publications on World War II from the
Merriam Press. The World War II News Blog is managed by Ray Merriam, the
owner of Merriam Press.
| These links are to special pages on the Merriam Press web site.
|
| These links are to external web sites that have been checked and are recommended by Merriam Press.
|
|
Data on World War II Tank Engagements
Price: From $9.99 to $16.95
Data on World War II Tank Engagements Involving the U.S. Third and Fourth Armored Divisions
by David C. Hardison
A Merriam Press Original Reprint Publication
Military Monograph M321
First published in 1954 by the Ballistic Research Laboratories at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.
This is a study of a number of tank engagements of World War II involving units of the U.S. 3rd and 4th Armored Divisions.
The numbers of Allied and enemy weapons used and lost, the combat range, advantage of the defender, the advantage of initiating the aimed fire engagement, and the engagement termination are discussed.
An appendix contains the known details with explanatory remarks of the above factors and with particular remarks for each of 129 individual actions.
The conclusions made from the study of the data will surprise and fascinate everyone.
FROM THE BOOK
Publisher's Note
This monograph is a reprint of BRL Memorandum Report No. 798, published by the Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, in June 1954. The report was unclassified on 29 August 1972 under Department of Defense Directive 5200.10 (which actually stipulates that the material was to be downgraded at three year intervals and declassified after twelve years, although such is usually not accomplished until someone actually requests such to be able to utilize or copy the document).
The Editor is indebted to Abe Flatau for providing a copy of this report so that it could be reprinted and make it available to all who are interested in such matters.
—Ray Merriam
Abstract
A study of some tank engagements of World War II involving units of the U.S. 3rd and 4th Armored Divisions has been made. The numbers of Allied and enemy weapons used and lost, the combat range, advantage of the defender, the advantage of initiating the aimed fire engagement, and the engagement termination are discussed. An appendix contains the known details with explanatory remarks of the above factors and with particular remarks for each of 129 individual actions.
It is observed that, in the considered engagements, a great advantage was enjoyed by the force which initiated aimed fire and that small numbers of tanks were generally involved in the tank engagement. It is shown that there is no evidence in the data that the number of weapons used by the Allied force was dependent on the number used by the enemy force, and that a majority of engagements terminated with neither force being annihilated. The limited scope of the present study precludes attempts to estimate the relative combat effectiveness of the Allied and enemy weapons.
It is suggested that the tanks studied would have been greatly improved by:
a) a more effective method of detection of opposing weapons and
b) reduced time to obtain a killing hit once a target was identified.
Introduction
To estimate the combat effectiveness of a weapon, the evaluator generally needs some information as to the contemplated condition of its employment. The exact conditions of employment of weapons in tomorrow’s combat are unknown today. Their anticipation, it would appear, should contain a liberal portion of informed tactical imagination but should not fail to consider the combat experience of yesterday. It is clear that there exist no shortage of tank combat experiences. However, there is a shortage of tank combat experiences reduced to a form readily usable to the evaluator. It is the purpose of this report to present an analysis of a small portion of the available World War II combat data.
In an exploratory attempt to express tank combat experiences in a usable numerical form, a study was begun at the Ballistic Research Laboratories of historical records of tank engagements of World War II. The study indicates to date that the available information is extensive, that it is scattered throughout vast volumes of records, and that its extraction is neither rapid, direct, nor impossible. The present report is a result of the first efforts of the BRL to obtain tank combat data from these historical documents. The limited scope of the study demands caution in making observations based thereupon. The reliability of the data is at best no greater than that of the materials from which they were obtained.
It is noted that the engagements studied were viewed from a detailed rather than a strategic point of view. Primary efforts were toward ascertaining what the tanks actually did in battle. No attempt has been made to study the engagements as segments of the overall strategy.
Source of Data
The data given in this report were extracted from official military documents, including After Action Reports, Combat Interviews, Journals and Files, and Unit Histories, obtained from the Departmental Records Branch of the Adjutant General’s Office. A detailed identification of these source materials is provided in the bibliography of this report.
The method employed in extracting data from the documents has been discussed in a previous paper, “Terrain and Ranges of Tank Engagements.” The problem was essentially one of historical research and consisted mainly of fitting together the available fragmentary details of a series of individual engagements. In the study it was found necessary to supplement descriptive narratives with appropriate maps and overlays of the battlefield situation.
The Tank Engagement
Definitive Concepts of the Tank Engagement: The “tank engagement” is not simply defined. The first requirement is clear: a tank must have been involved. By common usage an engagement is a hostile encounter which may be general, as between entire armies, or minor, as between outposts. Such a nebulous concept has obvious objections, for the beginning, ending, and interim actions of an engagement are all related to what is meant by the term. Although a concise definition of “tank engagement” is not yet evident, the following general principles are stated as those which were followed as closely as possible:
a) An engagement was a hostile encounter between tactical units whose elements participated in a direct fire fight. It included those weapons which potentially were, or engaged, targets of direct fire.
b) The engagement began when one force brought to bear aimed direct fire at its opponent.
c) The engagement ended when neither force continued to subject its opponent to aimed direct fire.
d) That force attempting to occupy a new position was called the attacker. His opponent, or the force attempting to prevent this attack was called the defender, thus, motion was frequently the criterion used to determine the “attacker” and the “defender.”
The tank engagements studied were a part of fluid front warfare where maneuver and movements of forces were routine. Consequently, it is not always possible to know when a battle “began” or when it ended, which force should be called the attacker, which should be called the defender, how many forces were employed or how many tanks were lost. Consider, for example, the following over-simplified summary of the battle for the Siegfried Line town of Singling.
The 4th U.S. Armored Division had assigned as a Combat Command B objective the town of Singling. Combat Command A was to bypass the town and take the town of Bining. In attempting to bypass Singling, CCA came under direct fire originating in the Singling area and “lost five tanks upon topping the crest of a ridge south of the town.” Convinced that it was unwise to ignore the threat on the flank posed by the enemy forces in Singling, CCA sent a tank company with accompanying infantry to reduce the resistance there. The tank-infantry team reached the outskirts of the town under cover of friendly artillery and was deployed in an envelopment formation of three platoons when it began to receive hostile high velocity fire. The Allied tanks took cover in a walled orchard and behind several buildings. Any movement of the tanks brought in fire from the unobserved gun positions. Infantry located within the town several enemy guns (self-propelled guns and anti-tank pill boxes) and engaged them with shoulder fired weapons. It was “learned” (by what means not determined) that additional enemy armored weapons were in position back of a ridge 1200 yards north of the town. The CCA tankers anticipated the enemy attempt to reinforce the town’s defenders and a platoon occupied positions blocking the route of expected attack. When the enemy attempted his reinforcement, the Allied tanks waiting in the selected positions were able to ambush and destroy two Mk. IV tanks at close range. The reinforcement attempt was thwarted.
This action near Singling has been considered as two engagements:
a) the attempt of CCA to bypass the town (Serial 87 of the Appendix) and,
b) the assault of Singling by the tank-infantry team (Serial 88 of the Appendix).
In both cases the Allies were considered the attackers. The question remains unanswered as to whether it would have been more reasonable to consider the battle for the town as three engagements:
a) the attempt to bypass,
b) the tank-infantry assault and
c) the attempted reinforcement by the German forces.
The above discussion should re-emphasize the fact that while the concepts of the tank engagement appear logically simple, their numerical descriptions, due to the individuality of battlefield situations, require arbitrary qualitative decisions.
|
Product Options
| |
|
Price: From $4.99 to $9.95
NEW 2012 EDITION! Paperback $9.95 — PDF on DVD disk by mail $4.99
|
Armored Warfare in World War II: A Conference Featuring F.W. von Mellenthin, Generalmajor a.D., German Army, 10 May 1979. Available from Merriam Press as a PDF file on a DVD disk.
|
Identification of Foreign Armored Vehicles: German, Japanese, Russian, Italian, and French. Military Intelligence [Basic Field Manual FM 30-42]. Military Reference Library #L179. Acrobat PDF file sent by mail on DVD disc.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Military Intelligence: Identification of United States Armored Vehicles [Basic Field Manual FM 30-40] available as a PDF file.
|
Seek, Strike and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel. Available as a PDF file.
|
The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement of Nancy
by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
Available as a PDF file.
|
|
|
|
Price: From $6.95 to $29.95
|
Price: From $6.95 to $29.95
|
Price: From $4.99 to $19.95
REVISED AND ENLARGED 2011 EDITION — B&W Paperback $14.95 — Color Paperback $19.95 — PDF on DVD disk by mail $4.99
| |
Product Reviews
|
Shopping on this web site is secure.
FREE shipping in U.S.
5% discount on orders $50.00-$99.99
10% discount on orders over $100
We accept MasterCard, Visa, American Express, Discover credit cards and PayPal from all customers, and checks/money orders from U.S. customers.
| | |
| Sign Up To Receive Email Notifications About New Additions To The Merriam Press Site
| |
| | |
|
You do not need to create an account to shop on this web site.
|
|